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CROSSING OVER:  
ASSESSING OPERATION STREAMLINE  
AND THE RIGHTS OF IMMIGRANT  
CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS AT THE BORDER 
Edith Nazarian* 
Bent on curbing unauthorized immigration in the United States, the 
Department of Homeland Security has implemented Operation 
Streamline—a program aimed at criminally prosecuting all 
unauthorized immigrants along a five-mile stretch of the U.S.-Mexico 
border. While lauded by proponents as a success, Streamline has driven 
courts to conduct en masse hearings that ultimately compromise 
immigrant criminal defendants’ due process rights. Although the Ninth 
Circuit recently held in United States v. Roblero-Solis that these en 
masse proceedings violate Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, this Article argues that by basing its holding on a 
procedural rule, Roblero-Solis fails to fully protect the rights of 
immigrant criminal defendants at the border. To eliminate this problem, 
this Article calls for courts to base these defendants’ rights on the 
Constitution and to apply the civil theory of territoriality—and reject 
the civil doctrines of plenary power and the ascending scale of rights—
in criminal proceedings. To help ensure the application of these 
theories, this Article proposes a system that allows the courts to reduce 
the number of unauthorized immigrants that it prosecutes and to 
remedy any violations of the rights of the immigrants that it does. 
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It is easy to make light of insistence on scrupulous regard 
for the safeguards of civil liberties when invoked on behalf 
of the unworthy. It is too easy. History bears testimony that 
by such disregard are the rights of liberty extinguished, 
heedlessly at first, then stealthily, and brazenly in the end. 
—Justice Frankfurter1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Since the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
implemented Operation Streamline (“Streamline”) to combat 
unauthorized immigration along the U.S.-Mexico border in 2005,2 as 
many as one hundred immigrants are brought in shackles each day to 
a Tucson federal courthouse to be prosecuted for illegal entry.3 
Streamline’s zero-tolerance policy of criminally prosecuting all 
unauthorized immigrants,4 coupled with the sheer volume of 
unauthorized immigrants being apprehended along the border,5 has 
compelled the courts to conduct en masse hearings that ultimately 
compromise immigrant criminal defendants’ due process rights.6 
Recently, in United States v. Roblero-Solis,7 the Ninth Circuit Court 
of Appeals addressed Streamline’s shortcomings and held that en 
masse proceedings violate Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure.8 While the Roblero-Solis holding is undoubtedly a 
positive step in protecting the rights of immigrant criminal 
defendants at the border, it has not been a cure-all: even though 
courts have changed their procedures in an effort to comply with the 
Roblero-Solis decision, en masse proceedings in various forms still 
 
 1. Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 597 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
 2. Donald Kerwin & Kristen McCabe, Arrested on Entry: Operation Streamline and the 
Prosecution of Immigration Crimes, MIGRATION POLICY INST. (Apr. 29, 2010), 
http://migrationinformation.org/feature/display.cfm?id=780. 
 3. Jennifer M. Chacón, Managing Migration Through Crime, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 
SIDEBAR 135, 142 (2009). 
 4. Kerwin & McCabe, supra note 2. 
 5. Since Streamline’s implementation in Tucson, Arizona, in 2008, for example, the district 
has reportedly prosecuted about 30,000 persons. Stephen Lemons, Operation Streamline Treats 
Migrants like Cattle, MIAMI NEW TIMES (Oct. 21, 2010), http://www.miaminewtimes.com/2010-
10-21/news/operation-streamline-treats-migrants-like-cattle. 
 6. See United States v. Roblero-Solis, 588 F.3d 692, 693–94 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 7. 588 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 8. Id. at 693–94. 
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persist.9 Moreover, by narrowly grounding its holding in the Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure and not the Constitution, the court 
deprived these defendants of more protective rights by following a 
pattern typically only necessary in civil immigration proceedings.10 
This Article suggests that such an approach, if adopted by 
subsequent courts, stands to undermine important constitutional 
protections for immigrant criminal defendants. This Article further 
recommends that, for criminal defendants prosecuted at the border, 
courts should situate due process rights in the Constitution rather 
than in specific statutes or procedural rules that are subject to 
congressional change. In reaching this conclusion, this Article rejects 
the application of the “plenary power doctrine,” which advocates 
congressional deference in civil proceedings, and the “ascending 
scale of rights” theory, which grants rights to unauthorized 
immigrants only after they have gained substantial connections with 
the country, in criminal proceedings. Instead, this Article argues that 
courts should apply the theory of “territoriality,” which premises 
constitutional rights on a defendant’s physical presence on U.S. soil, 
in criminal prosecutions of unauthorized immigrants. In addition, this 
Article proposes that courts should only criminally prosecute as 
many immigrant criminal defendants as they can without depriving 
these defendants of their full procedural rights. Should the courts fail 
to protect these rights, then remedial efforts—such as dropping the 
criminal conviction and giving the defendant the option to either 
leave the United States voluntarily or go through civil removal 
proceedings—should be implemented to alleviate the harm. 
Part II provides background on Streamline and the Roblero-Solis 
opinion. Part III discusses the way in which Roblero-Solis serves as 
an example in a criminal case of what has been commonly seen in 
the civil realm—namely, courts drawing from the Constitution but 
ultimately granting rights to immigrants under statutes—and cautions 
 
 9. Lemons, supra note 5 (“And yet [even after Roblero-Solis], these en masse hearings 
continue. And though Tucson magistrates now take pleas individually, some questions are still 
asked of 70 people at a time or of smaller groups of seven at a time.”); see Joanna Lydgate, 
Assembly-Line Justice: A Review of Operation Streamline, WARREN INST. 14 (Jan. 2010), 
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Operation_Streamline_Policy_Brief.pdf (“Tucson magistrate 
judges are using a variety of different plea procedures to comply with the Ninth Circuit’s opinion, 
and while plea hearings are taking longer than they used to, the court still processes 70 Operation 
Streamline defendants each day.”). 
 10. See infra Part III. 
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that this approach should not cross over into criminal proceedings. 
Part IV offers a critique of the plenary power doctrine and argues 
that it should have no place in criminal proceedings given the innate 
differences between criminal and civil proceedings. Part IV further 
argues that courts should strive to base their decisions on the 
Constitution to preserve criminal defendants’ constitutional rights 
from the reach of plenary power. Part V rejects the ascending-scale-
of-rights model and argues that territoriality should prevail in 
criminal proceedings. Part VI proposes a method for courts to ensure 
that immigrant criminal defendants receive the full protection of their 
procedural rights. Part VII concludes. 
II.  CHANGING THE IMMIGRATION LANDSCAPE:  
AN OVERVIEW OF  
STREAMLINE AND ROBLERO-SOLIS 
This part begins by discussing Streamline—its policies and the 
critiques that have been leveled against it—and how the program has 
affected the United States’ treatment of unauthorized immigrants. It 
then describes the Ninth Circuit decision of United States v. Roblero-
Solis and how that court attempted to respond to some of 
Streamline’s concerns. 
A.  Border Enforcement Post-Streamline 
Before Streamline, the U.S. government primarily regulated 
immigration matters in civil proceedings.11 After 9/11, however, the 
courts experienced an explosion of immigration-related 
prosecutions.12 This explosion only augmented when, in 2005, DHS 
implemented Streamline, a program intended to enforce the nation’s 
immigration laws and secure its borders along a five-mile stretch of 
 
 11. Chacón, supra note 3, at 137. Indeed, the concept of immigration is so connected with 
the civil sphere that scholars define “immigration law” as the “admission and expulsion of 
aliens,” see, e.g., Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary 
Congressional Power, 1984 SUP. CT. REV. 255, 256 (1984), with “expulsion” referring to 
“deportation,” see id., a hearing that the Supreme Court has defined as “a purely civil action,” 
INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984). 
 12. Chacón, supra note 3, at 139 (“The prosecution of migration-related offenses exploded 
in the wake of September 11, 2001. In 2004, U.S. magistrates convicted 15,662 noncitizens of 
immigration crimes, and U.S. district court judges convicted another 15,546.”); see Lydgate, 
supra note 9, at 2 (noting that federal magistrate judges witnessed their misdemeanor immigration 
caseloads more than quadruple between 2002 and 2008). 
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the U.S.-Mexico border.13 Before Streamline, Border Patrol officials 
would either return first-time unauthorized immigrants to their home 
countries or place them in the civil immigration system for 
removal.14 However, under Streamline’s zero-tolerance policy, 
officials within districts implementing the program must now refer 
practically all unauthorized persons to criminal prosecution.15 First-
time offenders are charged with the misdemeanor of illegal entry, 
while those who have been removed previously and attempt to 
unlawfully enter the United States again are charged with felony 
reentry.16 
Since Streamline’s implementation, DHS has lauded the 
program as an effective deterrence against unauthorized 
immigration.17 The program, which began in Del Rio, Texas, has 
expanded to seven more of the eleven federal district courts that abut 
the southwestern border18 and, because of its apparent success, may 
expand to even more.19 Critics, however, have countered the claim 
that Streamline serves as a deterrent by arguing that the incentive to 
find work and reunite with family in the United States outweighs the 
consequences of criminal punishment.20 They further contend that the 
 
 13. Kerwin & McCabe, supra note 2. 
 14. Lydgate, supra note 9, at 1. 
 15. Kerwin & McCabe, supra note 2 (noting that those excepted from prosecution include 
“juveniles, parents traveling with minor children, persons with humanitarian concerns, and those 
with certain health conditions”). 
 16. Chacón, supra note 3, at 142–43. 
 17. Lydgate, supra note 9, at 5 (noting that DHS “has consistently given Operation 
Streamline credit for the reduction in apprehensions” of unauthorized immigrants at the border); 
see Michael Chertoff, Turning the Tide on Illegal Immigration, DEP’T HOMELAND SEC. (Nov. 24, 
2008, 10:41 AM), http://www.dhs.gov/journal/leadership/2008/11/turning-tide-on-illegal-
immigration.html (stating that the decrease in the number of apprehensions at the Streamline 
districts of Yuma and Del Rio is “not [a] seasonal anomal[y],” but rather, a reflection of 
“increased border security and the deterrence that comes with the prospect of spending time in a 
federal detention facility”). 
 18. Lydgate, supra note 9, at 1. Those districts are: Yuma, Arizona; Tucson, Arizona; Las 
Cruces, New Mexico; El Paso, Texas; Laredo, Texas; McAllen, Texas; and Brownsville, Texas. 
Id. at 3. Although Streamline operates slightly differently in each of those districts, all of them 
share the same zero-tolerance policy of criminally prosecuting all unauthorized immigrants. Id. 
For an in-depth comparison of the Del Rio, El Paso, and Tucson districts, see Joanna Jacobbi 
Lydgate, Comment, Assembly-Line Justice: A Review of Operation Streamline, 98 CALIF. L. 
REV. 481, 496–514 (2010). 
 19. See Ted Robbins, Claims of Border Program Success Are Unproven, NPR.ORG 
(Sept. 13, 2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=129827870. 
 20. Lydgate, supra note 9, at 7. Indeed, many unauthorized immigrants who have been 
interviewed after emerging from criminal immigration proceedings have stated that Streamline 
would not keep them from trying to reenter the United States. Lemons, supra note 5. 
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poor economy, the increased cost of border crossings, and the risk of 
death are the true causes for any decrease in border apprehensions.21 
Because Streamline lacks deterrent value—and because of its 
enormous cost22—several commentators have criticized it for 
diverting the government’s attention from more serious crimes.23 
Aside from the arguments against the program on a pragmatic 
level, Streamline has spawned a number of troubling due process 
concerns. Indeed, after being apprehended through the program and 
spending usually a night in detention,24 up to one hundred 
immigrants are brought in shackles each day to a courthouse to be 
prosecuted for illegal entry.25 Often, these defendants are wearing the 
same clothes that they wore during their journey26 and are 
undernourished.27 Before trial, immigrant defendants briefly meet 
with a defense attorney—who can represent anywhere from six to 
forty defendants at one time—to determine whether they have any 
defenses, such as citizenship or authorization to enter.28 If no defense 
exists, then counsel generally enters mass guilty pleas on behalf of 
his or her clients.29 Given the speed at which Streamline proceedings 
are conducted, however, defenses are not always uncovered.30 As a 
 
 21. Lemons, supra note 5; Lydgate, supra note 9, at 5–6. 
 22. Streamline itself does not have a set budget, drawing resources from other agencies 
involved in its implementation, such as Border Patrol, the federal judiciary, and the U.S. 
Attorneys’, Marshals’, and federal public defender’s offices. Lemons, supra note 5. In Tucson, 
Arizona, for example, DHS reportedly spends about $52.5 million each year to detain Streamline 
defendants. Id. 
 23. See id.; Lydgate, supra note 9, at 7–8. 
 24. Chacón, supra note 3, at 146. 
 25. Id. at 142. 
 26. Id.; see Max Blumenthal, “We’re All Parasites.” This Is Operation Streamline, MAX 
BLUMENTHAL (Feb. 15, 2010), http://maxblumenthal.com/2010/02/were-all-parasites-this-is-
operation-streamline (“All of the migrants were young and brown-skinned, with combed black 
hair, wearing the same clothes they wore during their perilous trek across the Sonoran Desert but 
without the belts and shoelaces they were forced to surrender to prevent suicide attempts.”). 
 27. One Streamline defendant stated that, after being apprehended, Border Patrol officials 
only gave her cookies and juice to consume, while another defendant described how Border 
Patrol had thrown her the cookies instead of handing them to her. Lemons, supra note 5. 
 28. Chacón, supra note 3, at 143. 
 29. Id. In pleading guilty, defendants waive the right to a jury trial and the right to be 
represented by counsel at trial. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(C)–(D). Virtually all Streamline 
defendants, however, plead guilty given that “[d]emanding a trial would mean a month or more in 
custody awaiting a trial date, far more time than a day or two of time served.” Lemons, supra 
note 5. 
 30. Lydgate, supra note 9, at 14. A supervisor at the Federal Public Defender’s office in 
Tucson, for example, has noted that there are times when she has discovered after a proceeding 
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result, these en masse hearings have ultimately compromised 
immigrant criminal defendants’ due process rights—a concern that 
the Ninth Circuit recently attempted to confront in United States v. 
Roblero-Solis. 
B.  Roblero-Solis and Rule 11 
On March 3, 2008, Abimael Roblero-Solis, Janet Roblero-Perez, 
Jose Vasquez-Morales, Gumercindo Martinez-Carrizosa, Jorge 
Rosales-Vargas, and Miguel Zarazua-Pichardo were apprehended by 
Border Patrol inside the United States without documentation.31 
Within the next two days, all six underwent one of two criminal 
proceedings before a Tucson magistrate judge in which they pled 
guilty to illegal entry with at least forty other defendants.32 During 
these proceedings, their attorney, Assistant Federal Public Defender 
Jason Hannan, objected to the court’s en masse procedure33 and 
asked the court to address his clients individually to determine 
whether they understood their rights.34 Hannan argued that the court 
could not determine whether his clients knowingly and voluntarily 
waived their rights unless it addressed them individually and that his 
clients, moreover, had a right to address the court personally.35 
After hearing Hannan’s objection in the first proceeding, the 
court asked Hannan’s clients separately whether they understood that 
pleading guilty forfeited their right to a jury trial before it returned to 
 
that a defendant spoke an indigenous language and, thus, did not understand his hearing. Lemons, 
supra note 5. At other times, she has learned that a defendant was a juvenile who should have 
undergone an entirely different proceeding. Id. 
 31. United States v. Roblero-Solis, 588 F.3d 692, 694 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 32. Id. at 694, 696. Roblero-Solis, Roblero-Perez, Vasquez-Morales, and Martinez-
Carrizosa, along with forty-three other defendants, appeared before Magistrate Judge Jennifer 
Guerin on March 5, 2008, id. at 694, while Rosales-Vargas and Zarazua-Pichardo, whose 
proceeding consisted of forty-eight other defendants, appeared before Guerin on March 6, 2008, 
id. at 696. 
 33. In conducting proceedings, the Tucson court dealt with the following sorts of issues en 
masse: advising the defendants of their rights, informing them of the consequences of pleading 
guilty, asking the defendants whether they understood their rights and the consequences of 
pleading guilty, asking counsel whether they believed that their clients were competent to plead 
guilty and were doing so voluntarily, asking the defendants whether they committed the elements 
of illegal entry, and sentencing the defendants to time served. Id. at 694–96. There were only two 
instances in which the court addressed the defendants individually: when it accepted guilty pleas 
and took roll. Id. at 694. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 697. 
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addressing them as a group.36 In the second proceeding, however, the 
court failed to even attempt to address Hannan’s objection.37 As a 
result, all six defendants appealed their convictions, and their cases 
came before four separate district court judges.38 Of these judges, 
only one vacated a defendant’s conviction by finding that the court 
had not resolved Hannan’s objection after he had clarified it; the 
other three ultimately reasoned that the magistrate had not committed 
any due process violations by conducting en masse proceedings 
because the defendants had been represented by counsel during their 
proceedings.39 
On December 2, 2009, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in 
United States v. Roblero-Solis rejected the district court judges’ 
reasoning by holding that en masse proceedings violate Rule 11 of 
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.40 Under Rule 11, a court 
must “address the defendant personally in open court and determine 
that [a guilty] plea is voluntary.”41 The Roblero-Solis court reasoned 
that the term “personally” implies that the judge must address the 
defendant not only in person, but also “in a personal manner.”42 
Indeed, the fact that “personally” comes after “defendant” in the rule 
underscores the notion that the judge’s speech must be made person-
to-person.43 Furthermore, while the Ninth Circuit conceded that 
proceedings containing more than one defendant do not necessarily 
violate Rule 11, it nevertheless stressed that “no judge, however 
alert, could tell whether every single person in a group of 47 or 50 
affirmatively answered her questions when the answers were taken at 
the same time.”44 Indeed, the court went on to say in even stronger 
language that “[n]either . . . [a] medley of yeses nor a presumption 
that all those brought to court by the Border Patrol must have crossed 
 
 36. Id. at 696. 
 37. Id. at 697. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 697–98. 
 40. Id. at 692–93. 
 41. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(2). 
 42. Roblero-Solis, 588 F.3d at 700 (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD INTERNATIONAL 
DICTIONARY (1986)). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
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the border” is enough to establish that a defendant has pled 
voluntarily.45 
In this way, Roblero-Solis can be seen as a significant decision 
advancing immigrant criminal defendants’ procedural rights. At the 
same time, however, the decision falls one step short of fully 
protecting the rights of immigrant criminal defendants by holding 
that en masse proceedings only violate the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure and not the Constitution. Indeed, this omission becomes 
all the more glaring by the fact that the Ninth Circuit referenced the 
Constitution several times throughout its decision. For example, the 
court began its opinion by describing the Tucson District Court’s 
adoption of en masse proceedings as “intended to preserve the 
rudiments of [Rule 11] and the [C]onstitution.”46 The court alluded to 
the Constitution again when it discussed whether the case was moot, 
given that the defendants had already served their sentences and had 
apparently been deported.47 Ultimately, the court determined that the 
case was not moot, reasoning that “[a]lthough we do not reach a 
constitutional claim in this case, we believe that analogous 
considerations counsel treating as alive these cases where the ‘time 
served sentences’ are so short that no appeal would be practicable.”48 
Interestingly, while the court denied explicitly ruling on a 
constitutional issue, it discussed the Constitution once again when it 
analyzed Rule 11’s use of the term “personally.” Indeed, after it 
concluded that “personally” mandates person-to-person 
communication between the judge and the defendant, the court 
commented that “‘[p]erson’ and its derivative ‘personally’ carry 
constitutional connotations.”49 In other words, the court appealed to 
the principles of the Constitution to bolster its argument that en 
masse proceedings violate a defendant’s Rule 11 rights, but it 
declined to take the logical step of grounding its holding in the 
Constitution. 
 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 693. 
 47. Id. at 698. 
 48. Id. (emphasis added). 
 49. Id. at 700. 
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III.  ROBLERO-SOLIS:  
THE CROSSING OVER OF  
CONSTITUTIONAL “PHANTOMS” 
By allowing constitutional principles to guide its interpretation 
of Rule 11, the Roblero-Solis court followed a pattern traditionally 
observed only in civil proceedings.50 Professor Hiroshi Motomura 
has described this practice of using statutes that draw from the 
Constitution as decision-making based on “phantom” constitutional 
norms, since the courts use statutes—and not the Constitution 
itself—to impart rights to noncitizens.51 For example, in Wong Yang 
Sung v. McGrath52 an unauthorized immigrant challenged a statute 
allowing immigration inspectors to preside over deportation cases in 
which they had also performed prosecutorial tasks.53 The Supreme 
Court held that deportation hearings must comport with the 
Administrative Procedure Act, which prohibited such doubling of 
duties, since doing otherwise would violate “procedural 
safeguards.”54 Thus, although the Court based its reasoning on 
legislative intent,55 the decision was a “phantom” because the Court 
used a statute to determine a “constitutional due process matter.”56 
Likewise, in Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding57 the U.S. government 
denied Chew, a permanent-resident alien, reentry after a five-month 
voyage on a U.S. vessel.58 Invoking § 175.57(b) of the Code of 
 
 50. For a discussion of the courts granting more favorable rights to noncitizens under 
statutes than under the Constitution in civil immigration proceedings, see Deborah Anker, Jean v. 
Nelson: Neutral Principles in the Supreme Court Without the Constitution, IMMIGR. J., Oct.–Dec. 
1985, at 1, 10; STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND THE JUDICIARY: LAW AND POLITICS 
IN BRITAIN AND AMERICA 233, 239–41 (1987); DAVID A. MARTIN, MAJOR ISSUES IN 
IMMIGRATION LAW 19, 25–27 (1987); Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of 
Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 
564–75 (1990). 
 51. Motomura, supra note 50, at 564 (“In immigration law, the ‘constitutional’ norms that 
actually inform statutory interpretation—which are norms borrowed from public norms 
generally—conflict with the expressly articulated constitutional norm—unreviewable plenary 
power. The former are ‘phantom’ rather than ‘real’ constitutional norms in the sense that they do 
not serve the first function of ‘constitutional’ norms—namely, direct application to constitutional 
issues raised in immigration cases.”). 
 52. 339 U.S. 33 (1950). 
 53. Id. at 45–46. 
 54. Id. at 52–53. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Motomura, supra note 50, at 569. 
 57. 344 U.S. 590 (1953). 
 58. Id. at 592–95. 
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Federal Regulations, the government furthermore denied Chew a 
hearing since it believed that disclosing the reasons for Chew’s 
exclusion would be “prejudicial to the public interest.”59 In his appeal 
to the U.S. Supreme Court, Chew argued, first, that the regulation did 
not apply to him and, second, that even if it did, the regulation 
violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.60 The 
Court ultimately accepted Chew’s first argument, determining that 
the regulation did not apply to Chew because his voyage on a U.S. 
vessel did not terminate the rights he enjoyed as a lawful permanent 
resident.61 In doing so, the Court was able to rule in Chew’s favor 
without explicitly addressing whether the statute itself was 
constitutional or implicating the plenary power doctrine.62 
Wong Yang Sung and Kwong Hai Chew—indeed, all of the 
immigration cases that Motomura discusses as having invoked 
“phantom” constitutional norms63—were cases in civil proceedings, 
which is the primary reason why Motomura does not necessarily 
consider the courts’ use of phantom constitutional norms 
negatively.64 For in civil proceedings, courts used statutes as a means 
to circumvent the plenary power doctrine65—a doctrine that 
originated in and has long pervaded civil proceedings to restrict 
judicial review of congressional immigration acts.66 Under this 
 
 59. Id. at 592. 
 60. Id. at 595–96. 
 61. Id. at 600. 
 62. As the Court itself noted, “We do not reach the issue as to what would be the 
constitutional status of 8 CFR § 175.57(b) if it were interpreted as denying to petitioner all 
opportunity for a hearing.” Id. at 602. 
 63. Motomura, supra note 50, at 567–72 (arguing that Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276 (1966), 
Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6 (1948), and Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945), are all 
cases involving “phantom” constitutional norms). 
 64. See Motomura, supra note 50, at 549 (“In my view, any fair assessment of phantom 
norm decisionmaking should reflect deep ambivalence. On the one hand, it has been an 
understandable and perhaps even noble response to the shortcomings of the plenary power 
doctrine, and for that reason I do not intend the term ‘phantom’ pejoratively. More generally, the 
use of phantom norms during a transitional phase may be a healthy form of constitutional change. 
On the other hand, statutory interpretation confuses and contorts the law when the interpreting 
court relies for an extended period on constitutional norms that are doctrinally ‘improper’ in the 
sense that they do not control in cases which explicitly involve interpreting the Constitution.”). 
 65. See id. (“The result [of court’s relying on phantom constitutional norms] has been to 
undermine the plenary power doctrine through statutory interpretation.”). 
 66. See id. (noting that immigration law “has developed over the past one hundred years 
under the domination of the plenary power doctrine”). The Supreme Court first invoked the 
doctrine in Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889), in which it upheld the 
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doctrine, Congress possesses sovereignty over immigration matters,67 
and the judiciary only rarely—if ever—considers constitutional 
challenges on that subject.68 
Roblero-Solis, however, is not a civil case but, rather, a criminal 
one. As such, the Ninth Circuit would not have needed to avoid a 
civil doctrine by grounding its reasoning on a “phantom” procedural 
rule and not on the Constitution. The fact that the court did base its 
holding on Rule 11, however, is all the more unsettling, as it suggests 
that the plenary power doctrine persists not only in civil immigration 
proceedings but in criminal immigration proceedings as well. Indeed, 
by grounding its decision in Rule 11—a procedural rule subject to 
congressional amendment69—the Roblero-Solis court has essentially 
allowed the issue of immigrant criminal defendants’ procedural 
rights to be subject to the will of Congress.70 By opening the door for 
the plenary power doctrine to enter into criminal proceedings, the 
Ninth Circuit’s decision has ultimately—and unfortunately—created 
 
constitutionality of a law that denied a Chinese immigrant reentry to the United States, even 
though prior to the immigrant’s departure, Congress had promised that he could leave the country 
and return. See id. at 589; see also id. at 609 (“Whatever license, therefore, Chinese laborers may 
have obtained, previous to the act of October 1, 1888, to return to the United States after their 
departure, is held at the will of the government, revocable at any time, at its pleasure.”). For a 
more detailed discussion of the plenary power doctrine, see Motomura, supra note 50, at 550–54. 
 67. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210 (1953) (“Courts have 
long recognized the power to expel or exclude aliens as a fundamental sovereign attribute 
exercised by the Government’s political departments largely immune from judicial control.”). 
 68. Motomura, supra note 50, at 547. An example of a case that actually ruled favorably 
toward noncitizens is Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86 (1903), in which the Supreme Court held 
that the government could not arbitrarily hold or deport a noncitizen who was within the United 
States, even if his presence was unlawful, without giving him a hearing. Id. at 101. 
 69. See Foreword to FED. R. CRIM. P. 
 70. One might argue that Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010), serves as a 
counterexample to the assertion that courts are not establishing Constitution-based rights for 
noncitizens. In Padilla, the Supreme Court held that, under the Sixth Amendment, an attorney 
must advise his client whether pleading guilty to a criminal offense creates the risk of deportation. 
Id. at 1486. However, Padilla differs from Roblero-Solis in two key ways. First, unlike Roblero-
Solis, Padilla is a Supreme Court case dealing with an issue that arose from state court. See id. at 
1478. Thus, while Roblero-Solis could have been based on either the Constitution or the Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Court in Padilla could only ground its ruling in the 
Constitution. While the Padilla majority could have accepted Justice Scalia’s argument that 
statutory provisions, and not the Constitution, should remedy any effective-counsel concerns, the 
reason that they did not likely stems from the second difference between Padilla and Roblero-
Solis. While both Padilla and Roblero-Solis dealt with issues affecting noncitizens, Padilla 
involved a legally permanent resident, id. at 1477, whereas Roblero-Solis involved unlawfully 
present defendants. This difference is important because, historically, the courts have treated the 
former group more favorably than they have treated the latter. See infra note 106 and 
accompanying text. 
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the risk of producing followers. Roblero-Solis thus stands to 
influence district courts in the Ninth Circuit, and perhaps even those 
in sister circuits, to conclude that plenary power applies in criminal, 
as well as civil, proceedings. 
IV.  THE PLENARY POWER DOCTRINE:  
A “CROSSOVER”  
THAT SHOULD NOT OCCUR 
If the Roblero-Solis opinion means that the plenary power 
doctrine applies in criminal proceedings, we should be particularly 
wary. Indeed, there are several reasons why the plenary power 
doctrine should not apply to criminal proceedings of unauthorized 
immigrants: scholarly debate, contemporary court rulings, and the 
dangers inherent in the doctrine all counsel against it. 
A.  Plenary Power: A Doctrine on the Demise 
Even though courts have evoked the plenary power doctrine in 
civil immigration proceedings for at least a century, this has not 
stopped scholars from disputing the doctrine’s legitimacy. Indeed, 
some have attacked the doctrine by arguing that it has no 
constitutional support in either civil or criminal proceedings. As one 
scholar argues, although the Constitution does not overtly discuss 
noncitizens’ rights, certain provisions in the Constitution suggest that 
the Constitution’s framers never intended for plenary power to apply 
to Congress in immigration matters.71 For instance, the fact that the 
framers included the Naturalization72 and Migration and Importation 
Clauses73 in the Constitution illustrates that they intended to place 
constitutional limits on Congress’s power over immigration: if 
Congress had inherent power over immigration, then these clauses 
 
 71. Jim Rosenfeld, Deportation Proceedings and Due Process of Law, 26 COLUM. HUM. 
RTS. L. REV. 713, 718 (1995). 
 72. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (granting Congress the power “[t]o establish an uniform 
Rule of Naturalization”). 
 73. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1 (“The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of 
the States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior 
to the Year one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a Tax or duty may be imposed on such 
Importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each Person.”). 
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specifically discussing Congress’s authority over the subject would 
have been unnecessary.74 
Regardless of the veracity of this argument, it nevertheless 
remains that courts have relied on the plenary power doctrine in civil 
proceedings.75 However, certain modern Supreme Court decisions 
suggest that the doctrine’s stronghold over civil immigration 
proceedings is loosening.76 Indeed, Landon v. Plasencia,77 Nguyen v. 
INS,78 and Zadvydas v. Davis79 are all examples of immigration cases 
in which the Supreme Court heard each case on its merits instead of 
immediately deferring to Congress, as the plenary power doctrine 
would require.80 
In Plasencia, for example, a lawful permanent resident 
challenged the constitutionality of an exclusionary hearing in which 
she was denied admission into the United States after she had 
attempted to transport several Mexican citizens into California.81 
Although the Supreme Court rejected the argument that Plasencia 
was entitled to a deportation hearing,82 it nevertheless accepted her 
constitutional challenge and remanded the case to determine whether 
her exclusion hearing comported with due process.83 
Likewise, in Nguyen v. INS the Supreme Court analyzed an 
equal protection argument brought by a lawfully present, removable 
noncitizen under the intermediate standard for gender-based 
 
 74. Rosenfeld, supra note 71, at 718 (“Although the Migration and Importation Clause 
primarily dealt with the slave trade, it is also thought to have addressed laws concerning non-
slave migrants. However, if the framers had contemplated an inherent power over immigration, 
the Naturalization provision and—to the extent that it addressed alien laws—the Migration and 
Importation Clause would have been unnecessary.” (footnote omitted)). 
 75. See supra notes 65–68 and accompanying text. 
 76. Matthew S. Pinix, The Unconstitutionality of DOMA + INA: How Immigration Law 
Provides a Forum for Attacking DOMA, 18 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 455, 479 (2008). 
 77. 459 U.S. 21 (1982). 
 78. 533 U.S. 53 (2001). 
 79. 533 U.S. 678 (2001). 
 80. Pinix, supra note 76, at 479–82. 
 81. Plasencia, 459 U.S. at 22–23. 
 82. Deportation hearings are now referred to as “removal” in civil proceedings. Chacón, 
supra note 3, at 140 n.28 (“Until 1996, immigration proceedings to prevent noncitizens from 
entering the country were termed ‘exclusion’ proceedings, while proceedings to remove a 
noncitizen that had already entered the country were termed ‘deportation’ proceedings. [The 
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996] consolidated exclusion 
and deportation, and labeled the resulting proceedings ‘removal’ proceedings.”). 
 83. Plasencia, 459 U.S. at 22. 
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challenges instead of under the rational basis standard of review 
typically connected with plenary power.84 The Court ultimately 
found constitutional a statute that imposed different requirements for 
attaining citizenship depending on whether the citizen parent is the 
mother or the father.85 However, by choosing to entertain the 
argument, the Court demonstrated more consideration of an 
immigrant’s rights than the plenary power doctrine would allow.86 
The Supreme Court further demonstrated the diminishing 
influence of the plenary power doctrine in Zadvydas when it stated 
that Congress’s power over immigration “is subject to important 
constitutional limitations.”87 In Zadvydas, a lawfully present 
noncitizen became removable after he committed a series of crimes.88 
Zadvydas challenged a statute that allowed the government to detain 
him over the set ninety-day period.89 Although the Court did not 
strike the statute down as unconstitutional, it nevertheless interpreted 
the statute to mean that the government could not detain a noncitizen 
indefinitely,90 thus imparting a certain number of rights to a 
noncitizen despite plenary power. 
While these cases are not the norm in immigration 
jurisprudence—rather, they are the exceptions in the judiciary’s long 
history of plenary power91—they nevertheless illustrate that the 
plenary power doctrine’s pull in civil immigration proceedings 
appears to be weakening. Given this decline, it would therefore make 
little sense to apply the doctrine in the criminal realm. 
B.  Plenary Power: The Dangers of Crossing Over 
Possibly the greatest reason against applying the plenary power 
doctrine in criminal courts, however, is the unique differences that 
make criminal proceedings more punitive than civil ones. Indeed, by 
 
 84. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 72. 
 85. Id. at 56–59. 
 86. See Pinix, supra note 76, at 481. 
 87. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 696 (2001). 
 88. Id. at 684. 
 89. Id. at 682, 685–86. 
 90. Id. at 659. 
 91. See Pinix, supra note 76, at 479 (“As recently as 1999, the Court continued to defer to 
Congress’s seemingly limitless power in the immigration arena. Thus, for over one hundred years 
the Court has avoided constitutional challenges to immigration laws by relying on the plenary 
power doctrine.” (footnote omitted)). 
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going through Streamline, immigrant criminal defendants now have 
criminal records, which can potentially carry significant sentences. 
For example, an immigrant criminal defendant convicted of illegal 
entry can be imprisoned for up to six months, while one convicted of 
illegal reentry can be imprisoned for up to two years.92 Furthermore, 
defendants convicted of illegal entry and reentry face being 
stigmatized as criminals—a repercussion keenly absent in civil 
proceedings.93 Given the harshness of the plenary power doctrine 
toward immigrants in civil proceedings, the doctrine seems all the 
more ill-suited in the high-penalty setting of criminal proceedings. 
Without the plenary power doctrine, it appears that criminal 
immigration courts would be freer than their civil counterparts to 
base their decisions on the Constitution rather than on statutes or 
procedural rules. Granted, common-law tradition dictates that, when 
given the choice between a statute and the Constitution, courts 
should rule on the statute, as it is the narrower ground.94 In this way, 
the Roblero-Solis opinion is not unreasonable. However, the court’s 
outcome is also entirely consistent with the courts’ general ill 
treatment of noncitizens in civil proceedings. Indeed, by avoiding the 
constitutional argument, the Roblero-Solis court creates dangerous 
precedent by leading other courts to protect the rights of immigrant 
criminal defendants less than they would under a constitutional 
ruling. 
For instance, should the Roblero-Solis case reach the Supreme 
Court and the Court hold that en masse hearings violate Rule 11, its 
decision would only bind federal courts. A Supreme Court decision 
based on the Constitution, on the other hand, would bind federal and 
state courts alike. Indeed, although the topic of immigration is 
largely a federal issue,95 state authorities have taken it upon 
 
 92. 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3) (2006). 
 93. See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 
1193, 1205 (1985) (“Almost every criminal punishment imposes some nonpecuniary disutility in 
the form of a stigma . . . . There is no corresponding stigma to a tort judgment.”). 
 94. Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) 
(“The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the 
record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of. This 
rule has found most varied application. Thus, if a case can be decided on either of two grounds, 
one involving a constitutional question, the other a question of statutory construction or general 
law, the Court will decide only the latter.”). 
 95. See, e.g., Jay T. Jorgensen, The Practical Power of State and Local Governments to 
Enforce Federal Immigration Laws, 1997 BYU L. REV. 899, 902–03 (1997). 
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themselves to regulate immigration. In September 2005, for example, 
the Texas Border Sheriffs’ Coalition began to implement Operation 
Linebacker (“Linebacker”) in response to what it perceived as a 
“lack of federal support along the U.S.-Mexico border.”96 The 
program, like Streamline, aimed to increase border security, 
particularly in high-crime areas.97 However, unlike in Streamline, 
undocumented immigrants apprehended through Linebacker and 
charged with state violations undergo state—not federal—
proceedings.98 What is more, the program appears to be growing, 
with border-county sheriffs from California, Arizona, and New 
Mexico all calling “to implement Operation Linebacker-type 
activities across the entire southwestern border” with Texas.99 
Given this trend of prosecuting immigrants in state courts, it 
would be dangerous for federal courts not to base the rights of 
unauthorized immigrants in criminal immigration proceedings on the 
Constitution since the states might not follow suit. While states can 
grant more constitutional rights to individuals than the federal 
government can, they cannot grant less.100 Thus, when the 
opportunity and ability exist for the courts to rule on the 
Constitution, as they existed in Roblero-Solis, the courts should do so 
as this will ensure that these defendants’ constitutional rights are 
being protected, regardless of the kind of criminal proceedings that 
they are in. 
V.  ASCENDING SCALE OF  
RIGHTS AND TERRITORIALITY:  
DETERMINING WHICH CIVIL THEORY  
SHOULD CROSS OVER  
INTO CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 
One may wonder why unauthorized immigrants who have only 
been in the country a few days should receive so much constitutional 
protection. After all, if our discussion of the plenary power doctrine 
 
 96. Adrian J. Rodriguez, Note, Punting on the Values of Federalism in the Immigration 
Arena? Evaluating Operation Linebacker, a State and Local Law Enforcement Program Along 
the U.S.-Mexico Border, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1226, 1247 (2008). 
 97. Id. at 1247–48. 
 98. Id. at 1248. 
 99. Id. at 1249. 
 100. James G. Exum, Jr., Rediscovering State Constitutions, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1741, 1748 
(1992). 
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has established anything, it is that, in cases involving immigration, 
courts have generally been reluctant to grant immigrants rights in 
civil proceedings.101 Nevertheless, when courts have granted 
noncitizens constitutional rights—that is, rights based on the 
Constitution and not on statutes—they have usually based them on 
one of two models: the ascending scale of rights or territoriality.102 
A.  The Ascending Scale: A Theory on the Rise 
Under the ascending-scale-of-rights theory, the number of 
constitutional rights that a noncitizen receives increases with his or 
her voluntary connections with the United States.103 The Supreme 
Court first described this theory in Johnson v. Eisentrager,104 a case 
in which the Court held that enemy German nationals convicted of 
engaging in military activities against the United States did not have 
the right to test the constitutionality of their confinement.105 Still, the 
Court observed, in dicta, that the United States has traditionally been 
most hospitable to the lawfully present noncitizen, to whom it has 
“accorded a generous ascending scale of rights as he increases his 
identity with our society.”106 
While the Court quoted Johnson’s ascending-scale language 
three years later in Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding107 and then again in 
 
 101. See supra notes 65–68 and accompanying text. 
 102. This is not to suggest that the two models are mutually exclusive; indeed, in making an 
argument for an ascending scale of rights, the Court has relied on some form of territoriality as a 
starting point at which the ascending scale begins. See, e.g., Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 
770 (1950) (“The alien, to whom the United States has been traditionally hospitable, has been 
accorded a generous and ascending scale of rights as he increases his identity with our society. 
Mere lawful presence in the country creates an implied assurance of safe conduct and gives him 
certain rights . . . .”). 
 103. See Mark A. Godsey, The New Frontier of Constitutional Confession Law—The 
International Arena: Exploring the Admissibility of Confessions Taken by U.S. Investigators from 
Non-Americans Abroad, 91 GEO. L.J. 851, 872 (2003) (“[T]he Supreme Court set forth a test, 
sometimes called the ‘ascending scale of rights test’ or the ‘substantial connections’ test, by 
which aliens are granted certain constitutional protections to the extent they have voluntarily 
connected themselves with the United States prior to the encounter with the United States 
government for which they seek constitutional protection.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 104. 339 U.S. 763 (1950). 
 105. Id. at 765–67, 781. 
 106. See id. at 770. The Court then went on to note that these rights “become more extensive 
and secure when he makes preliminary declaration of intention to become a citizen, and [that] 
they expand to those of full citizenship upon naturalization.” Id. 
 107. 344 U.S. 590, 598 n.5 (1953). 
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Landon v. Plasencia,108 it was not until United States v. Verdugo-
Urquidez109 that the Court applied the theory substantively to a case. 
In Verdugo-Urquidez, the Court held that a Mexican citizen who had 
been arrested and brought into the United States to be prosecuted for 
drug smuggling could not invoke the protection of the Fourth 
Amendment’s Search and Seizure Clause.110 In reaching this 
decision, Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, reasoned 
that the Fourth Amendment refers to “the people” and, thus, only 
applies to a group of persons who have formed such a connection 
with the United States that they can be deemed part of its 
community.111 As such, while Verdugo-Urquidez’s presence in the 
United States was lawful, the Court stressed that it was also 
involuntary and, therefore, not the sort of presence that constituted a 
substantial connection with the United States.112 Although the Court 
stated that it “need not decide” whether a prolonged stay in the 
United States, such as a prison sentence, would place Verdugo-
Urquidez under the purview of the Fourth Amendment,113 it 
ultimately reiterated Johnson’s view that noncitizens receive more 
rights as their identity with society increases.114 
Although Verdugo-Urquidez dealt with a lawfully present 
noncitizen, the Court implied in dicta that unauthorized immigrants 
must also have substantial connections with the United States for the 
Fourth Amendment to apply to them.115 As a result, several lower 
court decisions have interpreted Verdugo-Urquidez as requiring 
unauthorized immigrants to have substantial connections in order to 
 
 108. 459 U.S. 21, 33 (1982). 
 109. 494 U.S. 259 (1990). Although Verdugo-Urquidez dealt with the issue of the Fourth 
Amendment’s Search and Seizure Clause in the criminal context, the case draws its logic 
extensively from civil immigration cases, which is why it is discussed here. 
 110. Id. at 261–62. 
 111. Id. at 265–66. 
 112. Id. at 271. 
 113. Id. at 272. 
 114. Id. at 269. 
 115. See id. at 271 (“These cases, however, establish only that aliens receive constitutional 
protections when they have come within the territory of the United States and developed 
substantial connections with this country.”); Hiroshi Motomura, The Rights of Others: Legal 
Claims and Immigration Outside the Law, 79 DUKE L.J. 1723, 1770 n.228 (2010) (noting that 
Verdugo-Urquidez “might be read to suggest that unauthorized migrants lack constitutional 
protections without some showing of connections to the United States”). 
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invoke the protections of the Fourth Amendment.116 For example, in 
United States v. Guitterez117 the District Court for the Northern 
District of California applied the test and held that an unlawfully 
present immigrant could not suppress evidence incriminating him as 
a drug supplier because he did not possess “substantial connections 
with the United States to be considered one of ‘the people.’”118 More 
controversially,119 in United States v. Esparza-Mendoza120 the District 
Court for the District of Utah held that an unauthorized immigrant-
felon who had previously been deported was not entitled to the 
search and seizure protections of the Fourth Amendment because he 
lacked “sufficient connection to this country” by virtue of his illegal 
presence.121 And recently, in Rasul v. Myers122 the Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia Circuit stated that “[t]he long line of 
cases dealing with constitutional rights of both lawful resident aliens 
and illegal aliens establishes ‘only that aliens receive constitutional 
protections when they have come within the territory of the United 
States and developed substantial connections with this country.’”123 
 
 116. See Rasul v. Myers, 563 F.3d 527 (D.C. Cir. 2009); United States v. Esparza-Mendoza, 
265 F. Supp. 2d 1254 (D. Utah 2003), aff’d, 386 F.3d 953 (10th Cir. 2004); United States v. 
Guitterez, No. CR 96-40075 SBA, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16446, at *12 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 
1997), vacated, 983 F. Supp. 905 (N.D. Cal. 1998), rev’d, 203 F.3d 833 (9th Cir. 1999); Torres v. 
State, 818 S.W.2d 141, 143 n.1 (Tex. App. 1991), vacated, 825 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Crim. App. 
1992). While Motomura argues that the “prevailing view” is that unauthorized immigrants in the 
United States are protected by the Fourth Amendment, Motomura, supra note 115, at 1770, and 
labels the cases that have applied Verdugo-Urquidez’s substantial-connection test as “outliers,” 
id. at 1770 n.228, this does not change the fact that these cases exist and should not suggest that 
they should be taken lightly. See James G. Connell, III & René L. Valladares, Search and Seizure 
Protections for Undocumented Aliens: The Territoriality and Voluntary Presence Principles in 
Fourth Amendment Law, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1293, 1305 (1997) (“Recent lower court cases 
have raised the serious possibility that undocumented aliens in the United States are not protected 
by the Fourth Amendment.”). 
 117. No. CR 96-40075 SBA, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16446 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 1997), 
vacated, 983 F. Supp. 905 (N.D. Cal. 1998), rev’d, 203 F.3d 833 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 118. Id. at *1, *6, *22–23. 
 119. For scholarly criticism of the decision in Esparza-Mendoza, see VICTOR C. ROMERO, 
ALIENATED: IMMIGRANT RIGHTS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND EQUALITY IN AMERICA 71–91 
(2005); Anil Kalhan, Rights and Remedies: The Fourth Amendment and Privacy Implications of 
Interior Immigration Enforcement, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1137, 1195 n.229 (2008); Isabel 
Medina, Exploring the Use of the Word “Citizen” in Writings on the Fourth Amendment, 83 IND. 
L.J. 1557, 1581–83 (2008); Kal Raustiala, The Geography of Justice, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2501, 
2523 (2005). 
 120. 265 F. Supp. 2d 1254 (D. Utah 2003), aff’d, 386 F.3d 953 (10th Cir. 2004). 
 121. Id. at 1271. 
 122. 563 F.3d 527 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
 123. Id. at 531 (emphasis added). 
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B.  A Dissent of the Ascending Scale 
Although it appears that the ascending-scale approach has taken 
root in the civil sphere,124 the theory should not cross over and apply 
to unauthorized immigrants in criminal proceedings. One primary 
reason is that the standard is much too vague. Although Rehnquist 
argued that Verdugo-Urquidez lacked substantial connection with the 
United States for him to be protected under the Fourth Amendment, 
he never actually defined “substantial connection.” In fact, he 
declined to do so.125 
Interestingly, Rehnquist conceded the inherent difficulty in 
defining “substantial” in his dissent in Craig v. Boren,126 a case that 
held that gender-classified laws must be substantially related to an 
important governmental interest for them to be constitutional.127 In 
his opinion, Rehnquist criticized the word “substantially” as being 
“so diaphanous and elastic as to invite subjective judicial preferences 
or prejudices relating to particular types of legislation.”128 Indeed, the 
term is elastic. So elastic, in fact, that if a noncitizen’s rights are 
directly proportional to the substantiality of his connections, clear 
judicial guidance would still be required to determine exactly when 
he has formed a substantial connection with the country.129 
 
 124. See Katherine L. Pringle, Note, Silencing the Speech of Strangers: Constitutional Values 
and the First Amendment Rights of Resident Aliens, 81 GEO. L.J. 2073, 2084 (1993) (“A tiered 
system of aliens’ rights has emerged. . . . The alien seeking initial entry ‘requests a privilege and 
has no constitutional rights regarding his application.’ The admitted alien, however, is granted an 
‘ascending scale of rights’ in relation to her ties to the United States . . . .” (footnote omitted)); 
see also Denmore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 547 (2003) (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part) (noting that the law considers lawful permanent residents “to be at home in the United 
States” and, thus, grants them “greater protections than other aliens under the Due Process 
Clause” during removal proceedings). 
 125. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271–72 (1990) (“The extent to which 
respondent might claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment if the duration of his stay in the 
United States were to be prolonged—by a prison sentence, for example—we need not decide.”); 
see Godsey, supra note 103, at 872 (“The Supreme Court has yet to clarify . . . what sort of 
‘significant voluntary connection’ with the United States would suffice to trigger the protections 
in the Bill of Rights. Indeed, the Court expressly declined to address the issue in Verdugo-
Urquidez.”). 
 126. 429 U.S. 190 (1976). 
 127. Id. at 197. 
 128. Id. at 221 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 129. Indeed, of the courts that have considered whether a noncitizen has formed a substantial 
connection with the United States, none have been precisely uniform in applying the test. See, 
e.g., Martinez-Aguero v. Gonzalez, 459 F.3d 618, 625 (5th Cir. 2006) (finding that “regular and 
lawful entry of the United States pursuant to a valid border-crossing card and . . . acquiescence in 
the U.S. system of immigration” (footnote omitted) satisfied the substantial-connection test); 
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In this way, Rehnquist’s majority opinion in Verdugo-Urquidez 
differed markedly from Justice Brennan’s dissent, which did provide 
a bright-line rule. According to Brennan, Verdugo-Urquidez satisfied 
the substantial-connection test by virtue of being subjected to U.S. 
law.130 Indeed, if this were the test—namely, that constitutional 
protections apply to noncitizens if they are subject to U.S. law—the 
ascending-scale theory would not be difficult to follow. 
However, Brennan’s clear-cut view did not prevail,131 and as 
such, the ascending scale as it currently stands is untenable. This is 
particularly true in criminal proceedings. Given that many 
unauthorized immigrants who are prosecuted for illegal entry have 
only been in the United States for a few days, courts are unlikely to 
find the substantial connection necessary to grant these defendants 
the full range of rights enjoyed by a citizen criminal defendant.132 
Indeed, Verdugo-Urquidez only underscores this point by throwing 
 
United States v. Guitterez, No. CR 96-40075 SBA, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16446, at *17–22 
(N.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 1997) (reasoning that marrying a resident U.S. noncitizen, bearing and raising 
a child in the United States, paying three traffic tickets, paying sales and use taxes on certain 
items, and living in California for twelve years did not constitute a substantial connection with the 
United States), vacated, 983 F. Supp. 905 (N.D. Cal. 1998), rev’d, 203 F.3d 833 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 130. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 284 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“Respondent is entitled to 
the protections of the Fourth Amendment because our Government, by investigating him and 
attempting to hold him accountable under United States criminal laws, has treated him as a 
member of our community for purposes of enforcing our laws.”). 
 131. Granted, some legal scholars have argued that Verdugo-Urquidez’s majority definition of 
“substantial connections” can be read as offering a clear-cut test. Although they concede that 
Rehnquist never expressly defined “sufficient connection,” they nevertheless assert that the 
opinion suggested the per se rule that a noncitizen establishes a substantial connection with the 
United States by entering the country voluntarily. Connell, III & Valladares, supra note 116, at 
1340–44. However, these scholars’ interpretation of Verdugo-Urquidez is incorrect. For example, 
although Rehnquist asserted that lawful but involuntary presence in the United States “is not the 
sort to indicate any substantial connection with our country,” Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 271, 
he immediately followed this statement by stating that “[t]he extent to which respondent might 
claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment if the duration of his stay in the United States were 
to be prolonged—by a prison sentence, for example—we need not decide,” id. at 271–72. By 
juxtaposing these two statements, Justice Rehnquist therefore implied that voluntary presence 
alone does not satisfy a substantial connection. Indeed, it is voluntary presence plus a prison 
sentence—and this only might be sufficient. Furthermore, by assuming for the sake of argument 
that the unauthorized immigrants in INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984), had Fourth 
Amendment rights, and by stating that they, unlike Verdugo-Urquidez, “were in the United States 
voluntarily and presumably had accepted some societal obligations,” Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 
at 272–73, Rehnquist established that the substantial-connection test requires not only voluntary 
presence but societal obligations as well. 
 132. The language barrier and en masse proceedings hardly help alleviate this problem. 
Moreover, while a prison sentence might extend the number of days in which a noncitizen 
remains in the United States, it is unlikely that such a restrictive setting would foster meaningful 
community ties sufficient to establish a substantial connection with the country. 
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doubt on whether unauthorized immigrants are per se entitled to 
Fourth Amendment rights. As such, the ascending-scale approach 
should not apply to unauthorized immigrants in criminal 
proceedings. Rather, the most appropriate model under which to 
provide criminal defendants their constitutional rights should be 
territoriality. 
C.  The Judicial Landscape of Territoriality 
Despite the courts’ apparent predilection for the ascending-
scale-of-rights model, courts have discussed noncitizens’ rights 
solely on the theory of territoriality. Under this theory, an individual 
receives rights from the sheer fact of being on U.S. soil.133 For 
example, in Yick Wo v. Hopkins134 a noncitizen challenged a San 
Francisco ordinance that prohibited the operation of laundry 
businesses without the board of supervisors’ consent.135 The Supreme 
Court ultimately found that, by discriminatorily denying consent to 
laundry businesses run by noncitizens, the ordinance violated the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.136 In 
reaching this decision, however, the Court interpreted the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s mandate that no state shall “deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . []or deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws”137 as 
having “universal . . . application, to all persons within the territorial 
jurisdiction.”138 Indeed, in stating that due process applies to “all 
persons,” the Court suggested that these rights apply to all classes of 
immigrants; that is, to those who are in the United States lawfully as 
well as unlawfully. 
In Wong Wing v. United States,139 the Court not only accepted 
Yick Wo’s territoriality analysis but expanded on it. Citing that 
 
 133. See Linda Bosniak, Being Here: Ethical Territoriality and the Rights of Immigrants, 8 
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 389, 391 (2007) (“[T]he territorial conception of rights for 
immigrants treats a person’s geographical presence itself as a sufficient basis for core aspects of 
membership. . . . It says: once someone is in the geographical territory of the state, that person 
must, for most purposes, be treated as fully in.” (emphasis in original)). 
 134. 118 U.S. 356 (1886). 
 135. Id. at 356–58. 
 136. Id. at 373–74. 
 137. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 138. Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 369. 
 139. 163 U.S. 228 (1896). 
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decision’s interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Wong 
Wing Court reasoned that noncitizens within the territory of the 
United States must also be entitled to the protections of the Fifth and 
Sixth Amendments.140 As a result, the government could not sentence 
a noncitizen to hard labor prior to his removal without first providing 
a jury trial.141 
The Court once again discussed territoriality in Shaughnessy v. 
United States ex rel. Mezei.142 While Mezei’s holding was ultimately 
unfavorable to immigrants,143 it nevertheless conceded that 
noncitizens—even those who are in the United States illegally—can 
be removed “only after proceedings conforming to traditional 
standards of fairness encompassed in due process of law.”144 Thirty 
years after Mezei in Plyler v. Doe,145 the Court reaffirmed Mezei’s 
reasoning by asserting that a person “within the State’s territorial 
perimeter,” even one who unlawfully entered the United States and 
can be expelled, “is subject to the full range of obligations imposed 
by the State’s civil and criminal laws.”146 The Plyler Court, although 
focused on the Fourteenth Amendment,147 furthermore reiterated 
Wong Wing’s conclusion that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments apply 
to all persons within the territory of the United States, even those 
who are in the country illegally.148 
Significantly, Plyler held that states could not prevent 
undocumented immigrant children from accessing a public school 
education under the Equal Protection Clause.149 Although scholars 
have argued that the courts have limited the decision to its context,150 
 
 140. Id. at 238. 
 141. Id. 
 142. 345 U.S. 206 (1953). 
 143. Indeed, the Court ruled that a noncitizen attempting to re-enter the United States can be 
held indefinitely on Ellis Island upon the Attorney General’s judgment that the noncitizen posed a 
risk to national security. Id. at 212, 215–16. 
 144. Id. at 212. 
 145. 457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
 146. Id. at 215. 
 147. Id. at 205. 
 148. Id. at 212. 
 149. Id. at 230. 
 150. Motomura, supra note 115, at 1731–32 (“As a decision on constitutional claims by 
unauthorized migrants, Plyler’s holding has been confined to the context in which it arose. The 
Court’s equal protection rationale . . . relied so heavily on the involvement of children and 
education that no court has ever used it to overturn a statute disadvantaging unauthorized 
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the case’s territoriality analysis nevertheless remains relevant to the 
question of whether noncitizens receive constitutional rights in the 
first place.151 For instance, in Zadvydas the Court held that a statute 
cannot be interpreted to mean that the government can hold a 
noncitizen in detention indefinitely.152 In reaching this decision, the 
Court relied on Plyler, as well as on Yick Wo and Mezei, to assert that 
noncitizens within U.S. territory are protected by the Due Process 
Clause “whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, 
or permanent.”153 
D.  Territoriality: Providing the Grounds for Greater Rights 
Although the territoriality cases did not expressly hold that 
noncitizens on U.S. soil should receive the protections of the Fifth, 
Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments, no case expressly holds that 
they do not receive these rights. Thus, even though other 
considerations may have contributed to the Court ruling favorably 
toward noncitizens,154 the fact that the Court has stated that 
noncitizens should receive these rights supports the argument that 
immigrant criminal defendants at the border should thus be entitled 
to them. As Streamline demonstrates, however, such protections do 
not comport with reality. Indeed, if it were settled law that the Fifth 
Amendment protects immigrant criminal defendants, the courts 
would not be conducting en masse proceedings in any form. As the 
system currently stands, even on U.S. soil these defendants do not 
receive the due process rights that the courts in the territoriality cases 
purport they deserve. As such, this Article accepts a form of Justice 
Brennan’s approach in Verdugo-Urquidez and argues that the courts 
should grant immigrant criminal defendants the full range of criminal 
 
migrants outside the context of K–12 public education.” (footnotes omitted)); see Daniel 
Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control, and Punishment: Some Thoughts About Why Hard Laws 
Make Bad Cases, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1890, 1927 (2000) (“Courts today, as has long been the 
case, are generally unwilling to extend serious consideration to claims of rights by undocumented 
noncitizens. Plyler v. Doe unfortunately has virtually no progeny of which to speak.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
 151. See Motomura, supra note 115, at 1731 (arguing that “what matters is not whether but 
how the Constitution applies to unauthorized migrants” (emphasis omitted)). 
 152. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 682 (2001). 
 153. Id. at 693. 
 154. For example, in Plyler an important fact was that the unauthorized immigrants were 
children seeking public education. Plyler, 345 U.S. at 230. In Zadvydas it was significant that the 
removable noncitizen was subjected to prolonged detention. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 684–85. 
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procedural rights not simply because they are on U.S. soil but, more 
importantly, because they are subjected to criminal prosecution.155 
As discussed earlier in Part IV.B, the very nature of criminal 
proceedings is punitive.156 In contrast, unauthorized immigrants in 
civil removal proceedings have the chance to leave the country 
voluntarily, if a lawful way exists, and avoid the criminal 
repercussions of attempting to cross the U.S. border again in the 
future.157 Such an opportunity, however, does not exist for immigrant 
criminal defendants under Streamline.158 After undergoing criminal 
prosecution and formal removal proceedings, these immigrants are 
barred from lawfully entering the United States for at least five 
years.159 Moreover, if they again attempt to cross unlawfully into the 
country, they can be charged with illegal reentry,160 which bars them 
from lawfully entering the country for another ten years.161 Thus, as a 
result of being criminally prosecuted, these immigrants become not 
only criminals but, moreover, criminals who face a host of legal 
consequences. 
Since immigrant criminal defendants face the legal 
repercussions of a criminal prosecution, it only makes sense that they 
should be entitled to the rights that come with being prosecuted in 
such a proceeding. Justice Brennan expressed this view in Verdugo-
 
 155. Indeed, in conveying rights to parties, at times it is not the proceeding’s geographical 
location that is most important but the circumstances surrounding the proceeding that are. In 
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008), for example, the Supreme Court held that although 
noncitizen-enemy combatants were detained at Guantanamo Bay, and thus were not in a country 
where the United States held de jure sovereignty, they nevertheless were entitled to a habeas 
corpus proceeding since the United States was in complete control of the territory in which the 
detainees were held. Id. at 770–71. 
 156. See supra notes 92–93 and accompanying text. 
 157. ROBERT JAMES MCWHIRTER, THE CRIMINAL LAWYER’S GUIDE TO IMMIGRATION LAW: 
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 76 (2d ed. 2006). Voluntary departure can occur before the removal 
hearing if the noncitizen can pay his or her way out of the country after immigration proceedings 
have started, immediately before a master calendar hearing, or after a merit hearing has been 
completed. Id. 
 158. See Josiah Heyman & Jason Ackleson, United States Border Security After 9/11, in 
BORDER SECURITY IN THE AL-QAEDA ERA 37, 60 (John Winterdyk & Kelly Sundberg eds., 
2010) (“Standard Border Patrol practice involves offering the vast majority of Mexican border 
arrestees a voluntary departure, which means almost immediate return to Mexico and no record of 
having been deported. Operation Streamline involves setting up criminal charges for unauthorized 
border entrants . . . followed by a formal deportation.”). 
 159. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(i) (2006). 
 160. Id. § 1326(a). 
 161. Id. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(i). 
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Urquidez when he stated that “fundamental fairness and the ideals 
underlying our Bill of Rights” require the government to give foreign 
individuals certain rights when it expects these individuals to follow 
its criminal laws.162 The argument therefore is not that unauthorized 
immigrants should escape the consequences of breaking U.S. law, 
but rather that if the United States chooses to impose 
consequences—especially those that it deems to be beneficial by 
serving as a deterrent—it should, in fairness, entitle these individuals 
to the full procedural protections that they deserve in these 
proceedings. 
Indeed, fully protecting immigrant criminal defendants’ 
constitutional rights is crucial precisely because these defendants are 
often those with the least number of ties to the United States, and 
thus those whom we would deem least worthy of constitutional 
rights. However, as Justice Frankfurter stated in Davis v. United 
States,163 
It is easy to make light of insistence on scrupulous regard 
for the safeguards of civil liberties when invoked on behalf 
of the unworthy. It is too easy. History bears testimony that 
by such disregard are the rights of liberty extinguished, 
heedlessly at first, then stealthily, and brazenly in the end.164 
In other words, in failing to protect immigrant criminal defendants’ 
rights, the courts threaten to extinguish the rights of not only 
unauthorized immigrants but of U.S. citizens as well. John Stewart, 
who delivered the Virginia Resolution to the Virginia Assembly, 
expressed this fear when he stated, “If a suspicion that aliens are 
dangerous, constitute[s] the justification of that power exercised over 
them by Congress, then a similar suspicion will justify the exercise 
of a similar power over natives.”165 Thus, by protecting unauthorized 
immigrants’ criminal procedural rights, the courts not only protect 
the rights of U.S. citizens but also reassure the public that the justice 
system is operating as it should: fairly. And territoriality—which, 
unlike the ascending scale, is a clear-cut test—serves as the most 
suitable model to achieve such results. 
 
 162. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 284 (1999) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 163. 328 U.S. 582 (1946). 
 164. Id. at 597 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
 165. THE VIRGINIA AND KENTUCKY RESOLUTIONS OF 1798 AND ’99; WITH JEFFERSON’S 
ORIGINAL DRAUGHT THEREOF 8 (1832). 
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VI.  PROPOSAL:  
SO WHERE HAVE WE  
CROSSED OVER TO NOW? 
Because territoriality should be the theory that prevails in 
criminal immigration proceedings, the question then becomes one of 
application and implementation into the system as it currently stands. 
As this Article argues, to prevent injustice from occurring to 
immigrant criminal defendants, courts should only criminally 
prosecute as many defendants as they can without depriving the 
defendants of their full procedural rights. It furthermore argues that if 
the judicial system violates these defendants’ rights, it should give 
the defendants the option to leave voluntarily or be placed in civil 
deportation proceedings as a way to remedy the violation. 
A.  Step One: Where Prosecuting Less Means More 
If we are to give immigrant criminal defendants greater 
procedural rights, we must drastically decrease the number of 
unauthorized immigrants being prosecuted in our courtrooms. 
Although United States v. Roblero-Solis has led to a decrease in the 
number of criminal prosecutions of these defendants in federal 
district courts along the border, it has unfortunately not been enough 
to eliminate all violations of defendants’ criminal procedural rights, 
given that en masse proceedings, in one form or another, still 
continue.166 For example, although magistrates in Tucson now take 
pleas individually, they still ask certain questions to seventy 
defendants at a time.167 Nevertheless, the number of defendants that 
undergo Streamline shows no signs of flagging.168 Indeed, of the 
2,613 immigration-related prosecutions in August 2010, the Justice 
Department reported that 2,132—or about 82 percent—were 
prosecutions for illegal reentry alone.169 Moreover, although 
President Barack Obama signed a $600 million border security plan 
into law that same month, the plan’s provisions failed to provide any 
 
 166. See sources cited supra note 9. 
 167. See Lemons, supra note 5. 
 168. Id. 
 169. IMMIGRATION PROSECUTIONS FOR AUGUST 2010 (2010), TRAC REPORTS, 
http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/bulletins/immigration/monthlyaug10/fil/ (last visited July 17, 2011). 
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funds to ease the stress of the already overworked courts.170 In 
Arizona, for example, the courts are able to prosecute only about 
7 percent of the unauthorized immigrants that Border Patrol 
apprehends daily.171 And yet, despite these numbers, many believe 
that Streamline should be expanded to more districts.172 
To ensure that criminal immigrant defendants receive their full 
constitutional rights, courts must decrease their criminal caseload. 
One way the courts can accomplish this is by only prosecuting 
defendants who have committed more egregious immigration crimes, 
such as drug smuggling or human trafficking. Unauthorized 
immigrants who have been apprehended but have not committed 
such crimes would then either be sent back home or be placed in 
civil removal proceedings. In other words, these immigrants would 
largely be treated as they would have been treated before 
Streamline.173 
Such a system achieves two important goals: not only does it 
prosecute individuals who are more deserving of the consequences 
and stigma that attach to a criminal conviction, but by diverting 
border crossers away from criminal proceedings, it relieves the 
federal criminal courts of a substantial caseload. This system 
therefore frees up the courts’ time and revenue and, moreover, allows 
the courts to ensure that defendants are receiving their full 
constitutional rights. Indeed, with fewer prosecutions, criminal 
defense attorneys would have more time with each defendant, 
thereby increasing the chances that these attorneys will uncover 
potential issues or defenses. Most importantly, prosecuting fewer 
defendants eliminates the need for en masse proceedings. As a result, 
courts will be able to ask defendants questions individually, thereby 
assuring that each defendant’s response is knowing and voluntary. 
Granted, Streamline’s advocates would argue that the program 
deters unauthorized immigration and, thus, should remain as it 
currently stands. As discussed above, however, Streamline may not 
 
 170. Amanda Lee Myers, Obama’s Border Plan Doesn’t Include Money for Already 
Overwhelmed Courts, HUFFINGTON POST (June 29, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/ 
06/29/obama-border-plan-courts_n_630252.html. 
 171. See Lemons, supra note 5. 
 172. Robbins, supra note 19. 
 173. Other scholars have made a similar argument. See, e.g., Lydgate, supra note 9, at 16. 
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be as powerful a deterrent as supporters believe it to be.174 If criminal 
prosecution does not actually serve as an effective deterrent, it makes 
little sense, then, for the United States to continue prosecuting as 
many individuals as it currently does. Furthermore, given 
Streamline’s questionable deterrent value and exorbitant cost, we are 
left to ask ourselves: is it worth it? As this Article argues, it is not. 
Thus, even if the implementation of this proposal results in 
magistrate judges taking more time with each individual case, as the 
Supreme Court stated in Stanley v. Illinois,175 “[T]he Constitution 
recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency.”176 
B.  Step Two: “Removing” Procedural Deficiencies 
For the various reasons discussed above, it is crucial that the 
courts protect immigrant criminal defendants’ rights. If they fail in 
doing so, a remedy should be put in place to ameliorate the offense. 
One possible remedy that this Article suggests is for courts to drop 
the criminal charge and place defendants in civil removal 
proceedings where they have the option to voluntarily leave. 
Doing so succeeds in serving many goals. For example, in 
requiring the courts to redress a constitutional injury, the government 
checks itself to prevent it from violating the procedural rights of 
other defendants. Furthermore, if the government expects 
unauthorized immigrants to obey its laws but does not follow 
through with its own obligation to impart rights to these immigrants, 
this Article argues that the system should try to ameliorate this 
deprivation in order to comport with fundamental fairness. And 
indeed, placing the defendant in a removal proceeding or allowing 
him to depart voluntarily allows the defendant to evade the harshness 
of a criminal conviction. At the same time, it also accomplishes the 
government’s goal of decreasing unauthorized immigration by 
requiring the defendant to leave the country. In this way, the 
government not only protects those who are under its power and 
within its boundaries but also advances its desire to deter crime. 
 
 174. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
 175. 405 U.S. 645 (1972). 
 176. Id. at 656. 
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VII.  CONCLUSION 
In recent years, the fear of terrorism and crime has translated to 
harsher treatment of immigrants in the United States.177 While this 
harshness has manifested itself in several ways,178 possibly the 
severest treatment is that which has occurred in the criminal 
prosecutions of unauthorized immigrants at the border. Although 
Roblero-Solis was a positive step for the rights of unauthorized 
immigrants, by not basing its ruling on the Constitution, the Roblero-
Solis court opened the door for the plenary power doctrine to enter 
into criminal proceedings. And given the current treatment of 
unauthorized immigrants at the border, it is not difficult to see 
plenary power already taking hold in our criminal courts. 
Unauthorized immigrants are bound in shackles and herded through 
a judicial system one hundred at a time in what one Tucson judge has 
described as “assembly-line justice.”179 
As this Article has argued, this treatment must change. In the 
criminal proceedings of unauthorized migrants, the courts should 
base their rulings on the Constitution, not on statutes, and apply the 
civil theory of territoriality rather than the ascending scale of rights. 
To implement this change, courts must prosecute fewer defendants 
and give those defendants whose rights have been violated the 
opportunity to either leave the country voluntarily or enter civil 
removal proceedings. A system that fully protects the rights of 
immigrant criminal defendants comports not only with justice but 
with humanitarian principles as well. It only makes sense, then, that 
the United States must cross over to such a system. 
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